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Abstract. We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model
bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm’s choice between liquidation under Chapter 7,
renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bank-
ruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize
the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the
firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces
over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase
upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms
with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that
renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in
mature industries than for firms in growth industries.
Financial distress may cause traumatic events like default, bankruptcy, liquidation
or reorganization, whose resolution has a great impact on a firm’s financial and
economic policies. Several actions are available to firms to alleviate the costs of
these events, among which are commencing Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the bank-
ruptcy code, out-of-court workout negotiations to change the debt contract, and
open-market liquidation. In order to better understand the behavior of financially
distressed firms, their choices over this entire set of actions must be considered. In
this paper, we explore the determinants of the bankruptcy decision in the presence
of the other options to resolve the conflict between debtors and creditors.
Several puzzling issues arise when bankruptcy is viewed as a strategic decision.
First, why do firms commence Chapter 11 instead of directly negotiating with
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debtholders, thereby saving the costs of court settlement?1 Second, why are many
firms liquidated in Chapter 11 instead of being liquidated in Chapter 7?2 Third,
why is the absolute priority rule (APR) often violated in bankruptcy?
To address these issues in the absence of liquidity constraints, other frictions,
such as information asymmetry or conflict of interest between claimholders, must
be incorporated into the model. We focus on the conflict of interest between an
owner/manager and debtholders. In the presence of risky debt, this conflict results
in the well-known over- and under-investment problems. Our premise is that the
manager of a financially distressed firm chooses its actions in order to minimize
the loss in value due to these investment distortions.
We consider a firm with a standard debt contract, promising periodic payments
to creditors. The manager, who is also the owner of the firm’s equity, privately
observes the characteristics of the investment opportunities, while the creditors
investigate the firm and obtain an imperfect signal about these characteristics. If
the creditors discover that the firm should be liquidated, they may file a Chapter 7
petition for liquidation. If they do not file a Chapter 7 petition, the owner/manager
decides whether to (i) liquidate the firm, (ii) pay the current debt obligations and
continue operations, or (iii) renegotiate the debt contract. Renegotiations can be
done in a workout, i.e., directly with debtholders outside the bankruptcy court, or
under court supervision in Chapter 11.
When renegotiation of the debt contract is ruled out, the firm’s investment deci-
sion may be distorted in two ways. First, the manager may under-invest by refusing
to finance a positive net present value (NPV) project if debt value is increased by
more than the project’s NPV. Second, the owner manager may have the incentive
to over-invest by undertaking a negative NPV project if it reduces debt value by
more than the project’s NPV.
When the investment opportunity and the financial structure of the firm lead to
under-investment, a workout can eliminate the distortion. In this case, since invest-
ment increases debt value, debtholders are willing to compensate the manager for
undertaking value-increasing projects. Thus, debtholders will accept an offer that
reduces the face value of debt but increases its market value.
The manager will not initiate workout, however, when the investment oppor-
tunity and the financial structure lead to over-investment. Since over-investment
decreases firm and debt values, and since in Chapter 7 the firm is liquidated un-
der strict APR, debtholders commence Chapter 7 to prevent the manager from
over-investing. Therefore, the manager will initiate negotiations only when he is
1 In the presence of liquidity constraint, a possible rationale for commencing the costlier Chapter
11 is to obtain a ‘breathing spell’. Another frequently cited explanation for why firms resort to the
costlier Chapter 11, is the free-rider problem that may exist when the debt is widely held (see Gertner
and Scharfstein, 1991).
2 The 1978 US Bankruptcy Code designed Chapter 7 for liquidation and Chapter 11 for reorga-
nization. However, Flynn (1989) estimates that only about 10–12% of Chapter 11 cases result in an
actual reorganization of the filing entity. Franks and Torous (1989) find that the majority of firms that
filed for Chapter 11 protection did not emerge from it.
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protected from debtholders. This protection in Chapter 11 is accomplished through
the ‘automatic stay’. In this respect, Chapter 11 enables negotiations to take place.
In other words, Chapter 7 gives the debtholders so much bargaining power that it
pays the manager to commence the costlier Chapter 11, in order to get protection
and increase his bargaining power.
In Chapter 11, the court can affect the division of the surplus between the
manager and the creditors by determining the negotiating agenda and threatening
to cram down a reorganization plan. This enables the court to give the manager
incentives to come forward and negotiate the debt contract, thereby preventing the
loss in firm value. Thus, firms facing over-investment commence Chapter 11 even
though it involves higher direct bankruptcy costs than a workout.3
To derive the empirical implications of our theory, we assume that the bank-
ruptcy court implements the optimal policy according to our analysis. Based on
this assumption, we obtain predictions regarding how a firm’s earnings and growth
opportunities affect its bankruptcy decision as follows.
(1) In Chapter 11 and in workout, the owner/manager’s payoff is higher than
the payoff he is entitled to under APR. The reason is, that paying the
owner/manager above what he is entitled is required to induce him to make
more efficient investment decisions.
(2) Among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion commenc-
ing Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth
industries. Firms in mature industries tend to have lots of cash and poor invest-
ment opportunities, so they are more likely to face over-investment incentives,
and, therefore, commence Chapter 11.
(3) In Chapter 11, a firm’s total value and a firm’s equity value increase upon
announcement of emergence from Chapter 11, and decrease upon liquidation.
(4) In default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement
of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11. This is so
because workout filing reveals that the firm has positive NPV investments that
will be financed following the completion of the workout negotiations.
(5) Holding the level of debt fixed, firms with a shorter maturity of debt are more
likely to reorganize in a workout, and firms with a longer maturity of debt are
more likely to commence Chapter 11. The reason for this result is that debt
with shorter maturity increases the likelihood that the firm will need external
financing and therefore, face underinvestment incentives.
Several financial economists have studied the bankruptcy decision. Bulow and
Shoven (1978), and White (1980) consider a firm’s choice between continuation
and liquidation. Harris and Raviv (1990) consider a firm’s choice between liquida-
3 Our paper identifies a role for Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 in enhancing both firm and social
values. It may be argued that other mechanisms, such as auctions, are more efficient. As Easterbrook
(1990) claims, however, the fact that the current system endured for so long implies that it has some
advantages over other mechanisms.
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tion and reorganization. Brown (1989) shows how the rules of Chapter 11 affect
the outcome of the renegotiation process. However, since this outcome serves only
as a threat in the private renegotiation game, his theory does not explain actual
bankruptcy filings. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) consider restructuring both in
workout and Chapter 11. Giammarino (1989) shows that uninformed debthold-
ers may force the firm into a costly court settlement in order to separate solvent
from insolvent firms. Bergman and Callen (1991), Bebchuk and Chang (1990),
and Green and Juster (1994) study the negotiation process in reorganization. By
allowing the firm to strategically choose from this exhaustive set of actions, con-
sisting of continuation, liquidation, workout, and Chapter 11, we are able to address
additional issues, including the questions posed above.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the basic model.
In Section 2 we characterize the optimal investment policy and the resulting over-
and under-investment problems when renegotiation of debt is ruled out. In Section
3 we introduce the US bankruptcy code into the model. In Section 4 we incorporate
workout negotiations into the analysis. In Section 5 we compare bankruptcy laws
and practices in the US. The empirical implications are presented in Section 6, and
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1. The Basic Model
We consider a firm that operates for two periods, period 1 and period 2. The firm
has debt outstanding that specifies two promised payments,P1 andP2, to be paid
in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The firm has assets in place that yield a random
cash flowX in period 1. We assume that the liquidation value of the assets is zero,
so the liquidation value of the firm in period 1 isX.4 While the liquidation valueX
may consist of both cash and proceeds from selling assets, we will assume in the
analysis thatX consists of cash only. In addition, we assume that all agents are risk
neutral and that the interest rate is zero.
The firm is managed by its owner. In period 1, the owner/manager makes an
investment decision and decides whether to service the debt. In general, these
decisions depend upon the current cash flow,X, the terms of the debt contract,
and the firm’s investment opportunities. The investment opportunities in period 1
yields a payoff in period 2 from investingI , according to the following production
technology,
f (I, α)ν (1)
whereI is the investment level,ν ∈ R+ is a random variable with a c.d.f.G,
representing the uncertainty about the outcome of the production process, and
4 The qualitative results of the paper would not change if the liquidation value was larger or
smaller thanX. The liquidation value would be larger thanX if the assets in place had a positive
value, and would be smaller thanX if liquidating the firm was costly.
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α ∈ R+ is a parameter representing managerial quality. We make the following
standard assumptions regarding the production technology.
Assumptions
1. f (I , α) increases with bothI andα, concave inI , and the marginal product
of I increases withα, i.e.,fI (I , α) > 0, fα(I , α) > 0, fII (I , α) < 0, fIα(I ,
α) > 0.
2. fI(0, 0)E(ν) < 1, fI (0, α)E(ν) > 1 for someα, whereE(ν) is the expected
value ofν.
Assumption 1 is made to simplify the analysis. Assumption 2 guarantees that some
firms are economically viable while others should be liquidated.
Prior to period 1, only the probability distributions of the quality parameterα
and the cash flowX are known to all. In period 1, before decisions are made,α
is revealed to the manager but not to the debtholders, andX is revealed to all.
The debtholders investigate the firm and discover the value ofα with probability
r. With probability 1− r they continue to hold their prior beliefs regardingα.
The debtholders can then commence Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code, or let the
firm continue under the current debt contract. If debtholders have not commenced
bankruptcy, the manager chooses one of the following actions.
1. Continuation:the firms paysP1 to the debtholders, and continues operations.
2. Liquidation: the firm defaults on the loan (i.e., does not payP1), terminates
operations, and uses the available cash to pay its claimholders according to
APR.
3. Workout: the manager defaults on the loan, approaches debtholders and
renegotiates the debt without court intervention.
4. Chapter 11:the manager defaults on the loan and asks for court protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
If the firm is not liquidated in period 1, investment takes place, and profits
are realized in period 2. At this stage, the firm is liquidated and the cash flow is
distributed to claimholders. The sequence of events and decisions of the game is
presented in Figure 1.
2. The investment decision when renegotiation and bankruptcy are ruled out
We now analyze the investment decision, assuming that the debt contract cannot be
renegotiated. In this case, the only viable alternatives for the firm are continuation
and liquidation. We first characterize the first best investment level, which is the
investment level chosen by an all-equity firm, and then compare it to that of a
leveraged firm. This enables us to characterize the conditions for over- and under-
investment.
6 ELAZAR BERKOVITCH AND RONEN ISRAEL
Figure 1. Sequence of events.X is the cash flow in period 1,α is the quality parameter of the
production technology,r is the probability that debtholders’ investigation succeeds.
2.1. THE INVESTMENT DECISION OF AN ALL-EQUITY FIRM
When an all-equity firm continues operations, the owner/manager chooses the




f (I, α)νdG(ν)− (I −X) (2)
s.t. I > 0.
The integral represents the expected cash flow to the manager in period 2, and the
last term represents the net investment in period 1. The solution to Problem (2) is
denoted byIFB(α). For expositional convenience we denoteIFB(α) by IFB .
The firm continues operations if, under the first best investment level,IFB , the
continuation valueVc(α,X) exceeds the liquidation valueX. Thus, the value of an
all-equity firm,VFB , is
VFB = Max{Vc(α,X),X}. (3)
2.2. THE INVESTMENT DECISION OF A LEVERAGED FIRM
When the firm has debt outstanding, it is important to specify the restrictions on
dividends and investments. We assume that, in order to protect debtholders from
excessive distribution of dividends, the debt contract limits the amount of dividends
the manager can pay in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that no dividend can be
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paid before the firm is liquidated, and that the manager can distribute a liquidating
dividend only after paying the entire debt obligation,P1+P2. We also assume that
no investment can be made unlessP1 is paid.
The firm’s investment decision depends on whether or not the available funds
for investment,X− P1, exceed the required investment,I . WhenX is sufficient to
pay the first period debt obligation and make the desired level of investment, the
excess fund,EF , defined by
EF = Max{0,X − I − P1}, (4)
is retained in the firm. IfEF is larger thanP2, debt is riskless, the firm is not in
financial distress and the investment problem of the manager is identical to that of
an all-equity firm. IfEF is positive but less thanP2, the firm is in financial distress
and the optimal investment level when the firm continues operations is the solution
to
Vc(µ|EF > 0) = MaxI
{∫ ∞
(P2−EF)/f (I,α)
(f (I, α)ν + EF − P2)dG(ν)
}
s.t. X − P1 > I > Max{0,X − P1− P2}
(5)
whereµ ≡ (α,X,P1, P2). BecauseEF is added to the cash flow of period 2,
the integrand represents the cash flow to the owner/manager in period 2, and it is
positive wheneverν is larger than(P2− EF)/f (I, α).
When the available fund for investment is less than the amount the firm needs,
the manager must inject money to the firm. For simplicity we assume that the
manager can use his own resources. The required fund,RF , is defined by
RF = Max{0, I + P1−X}. (6)
WhenRF is positive the firm is in financial distress and the manager chooses
an investment level that solves
Vc(µ|RF > 0) = MaxI
{∫ ∞
P2/f (I,α)
f (I, α)ν − P2)dG(ν)− RF
}
s.t. I > Max{0,X − P1}.
(7)
The integrand represents the cash flow to the manager in period 2, and RF is his
additional investment in period 1.
The optimal investment of a leveraged firm,I ∗ solves Problem (5) or Problem
(7), whichever yields the larger payoff to the owner (unlessX < P1, in which case
I ∗ solves Problem (7)). The value to the manager when the firm continues and
investsI ∗ is denoted byVc(µ).
For low values ofX, the optimal investment level is the solution to Problem
(7). In this case, the manager invests less than the first best investment level. The
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manager under-invests because the new investment increases debt value by more
than the project’s NPV. For higher values ofX for which the firm has excess fund
and it is still in financial distress, the optimal investment level is the solution to
Problem (5). In this case, the manager over-invests because he invests debtholders’
money.5
In addition, debt also distorts the continuation/liquidation decision. Upon liq-
uidation, the manager must pay the debt obligationsP1 + P2 to the debtholders.
Thus, the liquidation value for the manager is
VL = Max{X − P1− P2,0}, (8)
which is smaller than the liquidation value of an all-equity firm,X. The manager
continues and invests if doing so yields more thanVL. Therefore, the manager’s
value in the presence of debt is
V ∗ = Max{Vc(µ), VL}. (9)
The manager liquidates too often whenX 6 P1 because he has to addP1 − X
to the firm in order to continue operations. The manager continues too often when
X > P1 + P2 because if he liquidates he must payP1 + P2 to debtholders. If
he continues, he has to pay onlyP1, and can use the remaining funds, including




There exist values ofX andα such that a leveraged firm invests less than the first
best investment level,I ∗ < IFB .
Over-investment
There exist values ofX andα such that a leveraged firm invests more than the first
best investment level,I ∗ > IFB .6
The exact values ofX and α that result in under- and over-investment are
characterized in Lemmas A(1) through A(5) in the Appendix, and are presented
5 These claims are proved in the Appendix. Note that the firm’s excess funds and, therefore, its
incentive to over invest, result from the constraint on dividend payments. If all the funds could be
paid out as dividends, the required funds would be positive and there would be no ‘free cash flows’
to over invest. Nevertheless, our results hold when shareholders can take dividends, as long as it is
bounded so that some funds have to be retained. To have excess funds, the dividend should be lower
thanX−I−P1. For any given dividend, there is high enoughX satisfying this constraint. In practice,
such restrictions exist to protect debtholders from being left with an empty shell.
6 Note that these cases include the continuation/liquidation decision. WhenI∗ = 0 < IFB a
leveraged firm liquidates inefficiently. WhenI∗ > 0= IFB a leveraged firm continues inefficiently.
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in Figures 3 and 4. These values are important for the derivation of the empirical
implications in Section 6. The only relevant result for the analysis in the next three
sections is that both over- and under-investment exist.
3. Bankruptcy Laws and Outcomes
We now introduce the bankruptcy law into the analysis. Before we analyze the
bankruptcy game, we now discuss our view of the purpose of the bankruptcy law.
Our premise is that the role of the bankruptcy law is to enhance economic efficiency
by both increasing the debt capacity of firms and implementing efficient liquidation
policy whenever possible. Specifically, we postulate that the purpose of Chapter 7
of the bankruptcy law is to enable creditors to curb the manager whenever they
learn (with probabilityr) that the manager has incentives to reduce the value of the
firm, and to maximize its debt capacity. To maximize debt capacity, debtholders
must get the highest cash flow possible. This is consistent with the rules govern-
ing Chapter 7, where, upon liquidation, the proceeds are paid according to APR.
Similarly, we postulate that the role of Chapter 11 is to facilitate efficient reor-
ganization when debtholders’ investigation fails (which happens with probability
1− r), while still maximizing the debt capacity of the firm. In what follows, we
take the existence of these two chapters and their main features as given, and show
their implications for the bankruptcy outcome.7
3.1. CHAPTER 7 OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
We now model the important features of Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy law.
When debtholders file a Chapter 7 petition, they have to disclose their information
regarding managerial incentives to the court. The court decides whether to approve
the filing and nominate a trustee to liquidate the firm. We assume that the court
approves the filing and nominates a trustee whenever the disclosed information
indicates that the manager has the incentive to reduce firm value. The trustee then
sells the firm to the highest bidder and distributes the proceeds to claimholders
according to strict APR.
Debtholders may file a Chapter 7 petition following either a successful in-
vestigation that indicates that the manager faces incentives to reduce firm value,
or, otherwise, if the manager, in the process of initiating workout negotiations,
provides the information to them when their investigation fails. In the first case,
debtholders’ decision is straightforward: it is a dominant strategy for them to file a
7 See Berkovitch and Israel (1995) for a formal derivation of an optimal bankruptcy law consisting
of both a creditor chapter like Chapter 7 and a debtor chapter like Chapter 11. In what follows, we
analyze the case where the debtholders do not learn the information. In the other case, they file for
Chapter 7 when they learn the information.
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Chapter 7 petition when they can prove to the bankruptcy court that the manager
has incentives to reduce firm value, and to do nothing otherwise.8
The more interesting and revealing case is when the debtholders’ investigation
fails. As we show in the next section, the ability of debtholders to file a Chapter 7
petition has crucial and surprising implications for the choices made by managers
of financially distressed firms even if the debtholders investigation fails. Therefore,
in the remainder of the paper, we investigate the bankruptcy decision under the
assumption that debtholders’ investigation fails.
3.2. CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
We assume that upon filing a Chapter 11 petition, the manager discloses the in-
formation about the quality parameterα to the debtholders and the court. This
assumption simplifies the analysis since negotiations are done under symmetric
information. Upon disclosure the firm bears the disclosure costKd . Since disclo-
sure is costly, the manager does not disclose the information unless he wants to
renegotiate the debt.
Before the manager can file for Chapter 11, he must petition the court for ap-
proval. We assume that the court approves the petition only if there are economic
gains from renegotiation. Otherwise, the court dismisses the petition as per Section
305 of the Bankruptcy Code for not being filed ‘in good faith’. In this respect,
we assume that ‘good faith’ corresponds to the existence of economic gains from
negotiations. When the manager’s petition is approved, the firm bears a fixed cost,
Kc. This cost may represent legal fees, loss of reputation, etc.
The main features of Chapter 11 that we incorporate are as follows. The
owner/manager controls the firm (‘debtor-in-possession’). He gets protection from
creditors through a statutory stay, called the ‘automatic stay’, of most creditors’
remedies such as lawsuits, setoffs and foreclosures during the Chapter 11 proceed-
ings. The bankruptcy court determines the negotiation agenda: which party is to
submit a reorganization plan and when the other party should respond. The only
constraint on the negotiation agenda is that the manager has the exclusive right
to propose a reorganization plan within 120 days after the petition for Chapter
11 is approved. We incorporate this feature by giving the manager a first mover
advantage in the formal game. The judge can use cram down to force a class to
accept an offer if it is ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’.
The negotiation game in Chapter 11 consists of three parties: a manager,
debtholders, and a judge. The game evolves in stages in which one party, the
manager or debtholders, makes an offer and the other party accepts or rejects it. We
capture the role of the judge by assuming that at each stage the judge determines
who is to submit a proposal. In addition, at each stage, the judge can cram down
a proposal if it is not accepted. The automatic stay is modeled by assuming that
8 When liquidation is costly, debtholders follow the exact same strategy, but now the liquidation
value is net of the liquidation cost.
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debtholders cannot sue the firm or file a Chapter 7 petition after the manager has
commenced Chapter 11.
The sequence of events at any stage of the negotiation game in Chapter 11 is as
follows.
1. The judge decides which party is to submit a proposal.
2. That party submits an offer that consists of a cash payment,Pn, o be paid by
the firm to debtholders in exchange for the outstanding debt.9
3. The respondent accepts or rejects the offer. If the respondent accepts, the game
ends and the payment is made.
4. If the respondent rejects, the judge can cram down the offer. If he does not, the
game moves to the next stage.
We assume that moving to the next stage involves a costly delay, represented
by a discount factorδ. The delay costs represent the (increases in) direct costs to
lawyers, accountants, etc., the (increases in) indirect costs such as a deterioration
in the firm’s reputation and the (increases in) costs related to relationships with
suppliers and buyers. In addition, to be consistent with Chapter 11 rules, the judge
has to give the manager the right to propose first. In Proposition 2, we show the
range of reorganization outcomes that the judge can implement.
PROPOSITION 2
The judge, by having the ability to cram down and by controlling the nego-
tiation agenda, can implement any payoff to the owner/manager in the range
[(1− δ)(VFB −K), (VFB −K)], whereK = Kd +Kc.
For now, we do not model how the judge determines the outcome of Chapter
11. Instead, we analyze the game for any given strategy of the judge. We denote by
P ∗ the payoff to debtholders that results from the judge’s strategy. Then, the payoff
to the owner/manager,V (P ∗), is
V (P ∗) = VFB −K − P ∗. (10)
The only restriction we impose onP ∗ is that the induced payoff to the
owner/manager,V (P ∗), belongs to the interval[(1− δ)(VFB −K), (VFB −K)].
In our model, the parties agree on the reorganization plan without delay, be-
cause, after disclosure, negotiations take place under symmetric information. In
practice, it may take a considerable amount of time to reach an agreement in Chap-
ter 11. This may result from asymmetric information, uncertainty about the true
situation of the firm, the time it takes to evaluate proposals and information, etc.
We do not analyze these possibilities.
9 Since negotiations take place under symmetric information, any type of securities swap that
eliminates debt (such as equity for debt swap) is equivalent to a cash payment.
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Figure 2. The bankruptcy and renegotiation game.E1 represents shareholders’ first decision
node,D represents debtholders’ decision node,E2 represents shareholders’ second decision
node.
4. Workout Negotiations
So far we have focused on formal bankruptcy as a mean of renegotiating the
debt contract. We now analyze renegotiations of the debt contract in an out-of-
court workout. As in the case of negotiations in Chapter 11, when the manager
initiates workout negotiations, he has to disclose the information about the quality
parameterα. As before, the firm bears the disclosure costs,Kd .
The sequence of events of the workout game is described in the bottom branch
of Figure 2 and is as follows. After the disclosure, the manager proposes a reor-
ganization plan in which the firm offers to pay debtholdersPs in exchange for the
entire debt outstanding. Debtholders, in response, can choose one of the following
three alternatives.
1. Accept the plan.
2. Reject the plan and propose a counter plan in which they getPd . We assume
that there is a delay before debtholders submit their plan. As before, the delay
cost isδ. In response, the manager can either accept the counter plan, continue
operations under the original debt contract, liquidate the firm, or commence
Chapter 11.
3. Reject the manager’s plan and file a Chapter 7 petition.
The following lemma describes the payoff to the manager in the workout game
when the option of Chapter 7 is irrelevant. In the case of under-investment, the
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manager and the debtholders can solve the problem in a workout. Therefore, the
judge will reject a Chapter 7 petition, making it a non-viable option.
LEMMA 1
Let W be the payoff to the manager in a workout, and suppose that debtholders
cannot commence Chapter 7. Then,
W =
{
(1− δ)(VFB −Kd)+ δV (P ∗) if V (P ∗) > V ∗ −Kd
(1− δ)(VFB −Kd)+ δ(V ∗ −Kd) if V (P ∗) < V ∗ −Kd. (11)
The lower part of Equation (11) is obtained when the manager’s payoff in
Chapter 11 is below his continuation value without an agreement in workout. In
this case, the manager receives in the bargaining a payoff between his continuation
value absent an agreement, and the first best value. The upper part is obtained
when the manager’s payoff in Chapter 11 exceeds his continuation value without
an agreement in workout. In this case, the value in Chapter 11,V (P ∗), becomes
the continuation value absent an agreement.
It can be seen thatW > V (P ∗) and, therefore, a workout dominates Chapter
11 when the manager has the incentive to under invest. Consequently, the manager
initiates a workout wheneverW is above his value from the best other alternative,
V ∗.
In the case of over-investment, the alternative of commencing Chapter 7 is rele-
vant. After disclosure, debtholders can prove that commencing Chapter 7 enhances
firm value. As a result, they can enforce the first best investment policy without any
concessions. Therefore, if the manager initiates a workout, he must offer debthold-
ers at least the debt value implied by the first best investment policy. This yields
a lower payoff to the manager than his payoff from continuing operations without
disclosing the incentives to over invest. Thus, the only relevant options for the
manager are commencing Chapter 11 or continuing operations.10 I Chapter 11, the
bankruptcy judge implements a reorganization plan yieldingV (P ∗) to the manager.
The manager commences Chapter 11 wheneverV (P ∗) exceeds the continuation
value,Vc(µ). Proposition 3 describes the manager’s choice when the firm is in
financial distress.
PROPOSITION 3
(a) Suppose the conditions for under-investment hold. Then, ifW > V ∗, the
unique outcome of the game is for the manager to initiate a workout. Otherwise,
he liquidates the firm ifV ∗ = VL, and continues operations ifV ∗ = Vc(µ).
(b) Suppose the conditions for over-investment hold. Then, ifV (P ∗) > Vc(µ),
the unique outcome of the game is for the manager to commence Chapter 11.
The firm will be liquidated in Chapter 11 ifVc(α, X) < X, and will emerge if
10 By the nature of over-investment, liquidation is irrelevant in this case since it is dominated by
continuation.
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Vc(α, X) > X. If V (P ∗) < Vc(µ), the manager will continue operations without
renegotiation.
Proposition 3 implies that the manager and the creditors negotiate in a workout
when the firm faces under-investment, and the cost of disclosure is low relative to
the loss in value due to under-investment. The manager commences Chapter 11
when the firm faces over-investment, and the costs of Chapter 11 are low relative
to the loss in value due to over-investment. The outcome of Chapter 11 is that
the firm continues and invests optimally if continuation yields the highest value,
and it is liquidated when liquidation yields the highest value. Otherwise, when
disclosure and bankruptcy costs are relatively high, the firm continues or liquidate
inefficiently.
The striking result of Proposition 3 is that firms commence Chapter 11 even
though it is more expensive than a workout. Debtholders’ ability to file a Chapter
7 petition discourages the manager from disclosing his information and privately
negotiate with the debtholders in the face of over-investment. The protection pro-
vided to the manager in Chapter 11 encourages him to negotiate the debt contract
in spite of the higher cost of Chapter 11. Thus, our theory is different from previous
bankruptcy theories in that it predicts that Chapter 11 is more than a threat in the
workout negotiations, and firms actually resort to it.
5. A Comparison to Bankruptcy Laws and Practices
In Proposition 2 we have demonstrated that the bankruptcy judge has the power
to implement almost any outcome in Chapter 11. This has often been observed in
bankruptcy cases, as evident by the widespread deviations form APR. This power
of the bankruptcy judge has been criticized by many scholars on the ground that
it enables managers to take advantage of creditors. Our theory provides a potential
rationale for such deviations.
For tractability, we did not incorporate into the model some of the features of
the bankruptcy code that we view as less important. For example, the bankruptcy
code allows managers to file for Chapter 11 protection when the firm is already
in Chapter 7. Similarly, creditors are allowed to ask to transform a Chapter 11
case into a Chapter 7 case. Thus, the role of the different bankruptcy chapters is
not as clear cut as we have been presenting it here. These additional options may
undermine our view of the role of bankruptcy court. If the manager can escape
liquidation in Chapter 7 by commencing Chapter 11, Chapter 7 is no longer a
viable option for creditors in the workout game, and our premise that Chapter 11
is needed to (selectively) limit the power given to creditors in Chapter 7 may no
longer be valid. This will be the case, unless the judge prevents the manager from
taking advantage of creditors, as explained below.
The manager’s option to commence Chapter 11 and his payoff there depend on
the judge’s decisions and actions. The judge can reject the manager’s petition, or
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give the manager a low payoff in Chapter 11 whenever the manager attempts to
convert a Chapter 7 case into a Chapter 11 case. Thus, if the role of the bankruptcy
court that we are advancing here is understood by the bankruptcy judge, he can sup-
port it either by rejecting a Chapter 11 filing of a manager who uses it strategically
to avoid a justified Chapter 7 case, or by giving the manager a low payoff in a case
where Chapter 11 follows Chapter 7. It is an empirical issue whether bankruptcy
judges think or behave this way. For our analysis to be valid, it is required that
the manager and creditors believe that, with high enough likelihood, the judge will
stick to the Chapter 7 payoffs if the creditors disclose the information first.
The actions of the bankruptcy court are also important for the derivation of
empirical predictions, since they affect both the method of renegotiation chosen in
equilibrium, and its outcome. Since we have no evidence on how bankruptcy judges
actually make decisions, our procedure will be to assume a given court’s behavior,
and then derive empirical predictions given this assumed behavior. Thus, we will
derive joint predictions regarding the bankruptcy court’s behavior, and the actual
empirical predictions regarding bankruptcy choices and price effects. Consistent
with our theory, we will assume in the derivation of the empirical predictions that
the bankruptcy court understands its role the way we have described it, and tries
to alleviate the investment inefficiencies caused by financial distress while mini-
mizing deviations from APR, in order to maximize debt capacity. This assumption
implies that the bankruptcy court grants the manager the smallest payoff necessary
to induce him not to over invest. That is, the judge setsP ∗ so thatV (P ∗) = Vc(µ).
6. Empirical Implications
In this section we derive the empirical implications of our theory. For this, a
discussion of the interpretation of different choices and variables of the model is
in order. The essence of the firm’s choice between liquidation, continuation, and
reorganization is who controls the firm’s assets. In liquidation, control of the assets
is transferred to a new management team. In continuation, control is maintained by
the incumbent management team. In reorganization, control may be maintained or
transferred according to the plan adopted.
In the model, we identify liquidation with assets sale. In practice, transfer of
control, or managerial turnover, can also be done via other control mechanisms
such as takeovers, litigations, and pressure by the board of directors.11 Therefore,
our empirical results regarding liquidation apply to all the mechanisms for transfer
of control. Another important implication of this interpretation is that, according to
our theory, emergence of firms from Chapter 11 under their original name but with
a different management team, should be considered as liquidation.
11 See Gilson (1989) for an analysis of managerial turnovers in financial distress.
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6.1. THE OUTCOME AND LIKELIHOOD OF WORKOUT, CHAPTER 11, AND
LIQUIDATION
In this section we analyze the probabilities and the associated payoffs of the dif-
ferent alternatives for reorganization. We first study the payoffs to the manager,
as measured by the value of equity, and to debtholders in reorganization. A direct
implication of Proposition 3 is that in order to enter Chapter 11, the owner/manager
must be compensated above his payoff under strict APR. This holds also for a
workout, because the manager has to be compensated to undertake good investment
projects. This is summarized in Proposition 4.
PROPOSITION 4
APR is violated in both Chapter 11 and workout.
Franks and Torous (1989), Eberhartet al. (1990), Weiss (1990), and Daigle
and Maloney (1990) investigating a sample of firms that emerged from Chapter 11
found that APR is violated. Frank and Torous (1991) found violation of APR in
workouts. We are not aware of any study documenting relative payoffs in Chapter
11 liquidations.
We now analyze how a firm’s required fund, measured by the difference be-
tween new investments and available fund, affects the manager’s choice between
Chapter 11 reorganization and workout. The effect of required fund on the man-
ager’s decision enables us to compare firms in mature industries to firms in growth
industries. Mature industries tend to have relatively high current cash flows and
little growth opportunities. In our model this is represented by a highX and a low
α. Consequently, firms in mature industries are more likely to have excess funds.
On the other hand, firms in growth industries tend to have a lowX and a highα,
resulting in positive required funds. This leads to the following result.
PROPOSITION 5
Among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms com-
mencing Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth
industries.
Proposition 5 is supported by Gilsonet al. (1990). They found that financial
distress is more likely to be resolved through private negotiations when more of
the firm’s assets are intangible.
6.2. THE EFFECTS OF DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE
So far we have assumed a fixed debt level,P1 + P2, and a fixed debt maturity
structure,P1 andP2. We now hold the debt level,P1 + P2, fixed and investigate
how changes in debt maturity structure affect the actions of financially distressed
firms. In our two-periods model, holding the debt level fixed, an increase inP1 cor-
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responds to debt with a shorter maturity.12 Debt with a shorter maturity increases
the need for external funds and, therefore, increases the likelihood that the firm will
face under-investment and will resort to a workout. Similarly, firms with long-term
debt are more likely to commence Chapter 11. This discussion is summarized in
the next Proposition.
PROPOSITION 6
Holding the level of debt fixed, firms with a shorter maturity of debt are more likely
to reorganize in a workout, and firms with a longer maturity of debt are more likely
to commence Chapter 11.
Gilsonet al. (1990) found that firms engaged in a workout owed more of their
debt to banks. Since bank loans have a shorter maturity than privately placed and
public debt, their finding is consistent with Proposition 6.13 Clearly, while this
evidence is consistent with our theory, there are other appealing theories that yield
a similar prediction. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) also obtained that short-term
debt implies a higher likelihood of under-investment and long-term debt results in
a higher likelihood of over-investment. By contrast, in Heinkel and Zechner (1993)
shortening the maturity of debt reduces under-investment in managerial effort.
We have assumed one creditor holding the entire debt. Usually, different cred-
itors hold the short- and long-term debts. Although the short- and long-term
debtholders may have conflict of interests, in our model this would not change
firms’ behavior in financial distress. Debtholders’ payoff in Chapter 11,P ∗, can
be allocated by the judge in any ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ way, leaving the manager’s
payoff and incentives unaffected.
6.3. PRICE EFFECTS
The bankruptcy process is dynamic and consists of several consecutive events.
Each event may convey information and, therefore, may lead to price changes. We
consider the following order of announcements. First, the firm defaults on its loan
payments and announces its intention to renegotiate the debt contract. This may
lead to either a workout or a Chapter 11 filing. Second, the firm announces whether
it is going to engage in a workout or commence Chapter 11. Third, the market
learns whether the firm liquidates in or emerges from Chapter 11. We assume that
at the announcement of default, the market has already learned the realization of
12 If there are more than two periods, the definition of long-term and short-term is less obvious
and this result may not hold.
13 James (1987) found that the mean maturity for commercial bank loans is 5.6 years, for privately
placed debt it is 15.3 years, and for public straight debt 18 years. It should be noted that the finding
in Gilson et al. (1990) is also consistent with the hypothesis that bank loans are renegotiated in a
workout and public debt in Chapter 11, because the holdout problem does not exist for the former
but does exist for the latter.
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X, but does not knowα and the outcome of the negotiation process. We also hold
P1 andP2 constant.
We first analyze the last announcement in which the outcome of Chapter 11
becomes known. In Chapter 11 liquidation, the total value to claimholders isX−K.
When the firm emerges from Chapter 11, it has additional value equal to the NPV
of new investments. Thus, when a firm announces that it has emerged from Chapter
11, its total value increases. The same result holds for equity value in Chapter 11,
V (P ∗) = Vc(µ), because it increases withα. These results are summarized in
Proposition 7.
PROPOSITION 7
(a) In Chapter 11, a firm’s total value increases upon announcement of emergence,
and decreases upon liquidation.
(b) In Chapter 11, equity value increases upon announcement of emergence,
and decreases upon liquidation.
The announcement effect on the value of debt is ambiguous. Since both firm
value and equity value increase for firms that emerge from Chapter 11, debt value
increases when the increase in total value dominates the increase in equity value,
and decreases otherwise.
We now analyze the price reaction when the firm announces its choice between
a workout and a Chapter 11 filing. Announcement of a workout reveals that the
firm needs additional funds and announcement of a Chapter 11 filing indicates that
the firm has excess funds. For a givenX, this translates to a higherα in a workout,
implying higher firm and equity values. It should be noted that for some values of
X there is no announcement effect since the choice of the type of negotiation is
fully anticipated.14 This discussion is summarized in Proposition 8.
PROPOSITION 8
In default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a
workout and decrease upon the announcement of a Chapter 11 filing.
Gilson et al. (1990) found a positive two-day abnormal return of 0.007 for
firms involved in a workout, and a negative two-day abnormal return of−0.167
for Chapter 11 firms.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a positive theory of financial distress based on
agency considerations. We show that when the investment opportunities and the
14 For low enoughX only a workout is possible and, therefore, the announcement of a work-
out conveys no news. WhenX is relatively high, only Chapter 11 is possible and, therefore, the
announcement of Chapter 11 conveys no news.
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financial structure of a firm lead to under-investment, a workout can eliminate the
inefficiency. When the firm faces incentives to over invest, the inefficiency may
be eliminated in Chapter 11, because a workout is no longer a viable alternative.
The theory yields a number of empirical predictions regarding the resolution of
financial distress, the effects of debt maturity structure, and price effects.
Our model can be extended into several interesting directions. Perhaps the most
interesting one is to investigate the optimal contracting at the time the firm is
established. In the paper we took the initial debt contract and the basic structure
of the firm as given. It is an open question whether these contracts are optimal
when the renegotiation methods and costs are taken into consideration.
Another interesting extension is to analyze the reorganization process under
asymmetric information. We have assumed that negotiations are conducted under
symmetric information. Thus, in our model, firms choose the appropriate negoti-
ating mechanism right away, and agreement is reached without delay. Extending
the model to allow for negotiations under asymmetric information may provide
new insights into why firms may start negotiations in workout and then commence
Chapter 11, and the length of time it takes to reach an agreement.
Our model focuses on the case where debtholders negotiate as a single group,
thus avoiding the implications of hold-out problems. This demonstrates that even
with a single creditor the choice of the negotiating method is important. The insight
and the predictions of our theory are different from those of Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991) which build on the hold-out problem. Combining these two approaches may
add valuable insight into the understanding of the bankruptcy decision.
8. Appendix
The proof of Proposition 1 consists of Lemmas A(1) through A(5) below. We now
describe Figures 3 and 4 that help understanding the proof.
Figure 3 describes the investment incentives given continuation for different
levels of α andX. The bottom line,XRF (α) (to be defined in Lemma A(2)),
describes pairs ofα andX below which the firm under invests. The line above
it, Xc(α) (to be defined in lemma A(4)), divides the area in whichRF = 0 into two
regions. BelowXc(α) the firm under invests, and above it, the firm over invests.
Pairs ofα andX between the linesXEF (α) andXFB(α) (to be defined in Lemma
A(3)) result in over-investment. Pairs ofα andX aboveXFB(α) result in the first
best investment level.
Figure 4 describes the continuation decision forX 6 P1 + P2. Define byαU
the critical quality parameter such that an all-equity firm continues (and invest) iff
α > αU and byαL(X) the critical quality parameter (as a function ofX) such that
a leveraged firm continues iffα > αL(X). Since in this case the liquidation value
of a leveraged firm is zero, it continues if its value from continuation,Vc(µ), is
positive. TheX that induces the right continuation decision isXc (to be defined
in Lemma A(5)). WhenX = Xc, the value from continuation is positive for any
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Figure 3. Over-and-under investment (given continuation). The bottom line,XRF (α) (defined
in Lemma A(2)), defines pairs ofα andX below which the firm under invests. The line above
it, Xc(α) (defined in Lemma A(4)), divides the area in whichRF = 0 into two regions. Below
Xc(α) the firm under invests and above it the firm over invests. Pairs ofα andX between the
linesXEF (α) andXFB(α) (defined in Lemma A(3)) result in over-investment. Pairs ofα and
X aboveXFB(α) result in the first best investment level.
α > αL(X) = αU and is negative otherwise. ForX < Xc, (e.g.,X = P1 in Figure
4), the critical value ofα, αL(X) is larger thanαU . Thus, whenX < Xc (e.g.,
X = P1), a viable firm withα ∈ (αU, αL(X)) liquidates. Similarly, forX > Xc
(e.g.,X = P1 + P2 in Figure 4), a non-viable firm withα ∈ (αL(X), αU ) that
should liquidate, will continue its operations.
LEMMA A(1)
The investment level that solves Problem (2),IFB , is smaller than the investment
level that solves Problem (5),IEF , and is larger than the investment level that solves
Problem (7),IRF .
Proof.The first order condition for interior solution for Problem (2) is
fI (I, α) = 1
E(ν)
(A1)
whereE(ν) is the expected value ofν.
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Figure 4. The continuation decision (forX 6 P1 + P2). The firm continues if its value
from continuation,Vc(µ), is positive. TheX that induces the right continuation decision is
Xc (defined in Lemma A(5)). WhenX = Xc, for anyα > αU , the value from continuation
is positive. ForX < Xc, e.g.,X = P1, the critical value ofα is αL(P1). WhenX = P1,
for anyα in the range(αU , αL(P1)), a viable firm liquidates. Similarly, forX > Xc, e.g.,
X = P1+ P2, a non-viable firm will continue in the range(αL(P1 + P2), αU).
The first order condition for interior solution for Problem (5) can be written as
fI (I, α) = 1
E
(
ν|ν > P2− EF
f (I, α)
) (A2)
whereE(ν|ν > [(P2−EF)/f (I, α)] is the conditional expectation ofν, given that
ν > (P2 − EF)/f (I, α). Recall that(P2 − EF)/f (I, α) > 0, implying that the
right-hand-side of Equation (A2) is smaller than that of Equation (A1). Thus, from
the concavity of (I, α) in I , it follows thatIEF > IFB .
Similarly, the first order condition for Problem (7) and the concavity of
f (I, α) in I imply thatIRF < IFB . Q.E.D.
LEMMA A(2)
The interior solution to Problem (7),IRF , is independent ofX and increases with
α. It exists iffX < XRF (α) ≡ P1 + IRF (α).
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Proof.The derivative of Problem (7) with respect toI is given by




IRF is independent ofX, becauseX is not an argument of Equation (A3).
We now show thatIRF increases withα. Since∂IRF/∂α = −Hα/HI , and since,
by the second order condition of Problem (7),HI < 0, it follows that the sign of
∂IRF/∂α equals the sign ofHα. Now,
Hα = fIα(I, α)
∫ ∞
P2/f (I,α)
νdG(ν)+ fI (I, α)
(









For anyα, an interior solution for Problem (7) exists iffRF > 0.
SinceRF = P1 + IRF (α) − X, an interior solution for Problem (7) exists iff
X < XRF (α). Q.E.D.
LEMMA A(3)
The interior solution to Problem (5),IEF , decreases withX. It exists iff X ∈
(XEF (α), XFB(α)) whereXEF (α) ≡ P1 + IEF (α,XEF (α)) and XFB(α) ≡
P1+ P2+ IFB(α).
Proof. As X increases(P2 − EF)/f (I, α) decreases and, therefore, the right-
hand side of Equation (A2) increases. It follows from the concavity off (I, α) in
I thatIEF decreases withX. To show the second part of the lemma, we first show
that the interval(XEF (α), XFB(α)) is non-empty. From Equations (A1) and (A2)
it follows thatIEF (α,X) approachesIFB(α) asX approachesXFB(α). Therefore,
for X close enough toXFB(α), IEF (α, X) < IFB(α) + P2, implying XEF (α) <
XFB(α).
At XEF (α), EF = 0. SinceIEF decreases withX, it follows thatEF > 0 iff
X > XEF (α). The proof is completed by noting that interior solution to Problem
(5) exists iffEF > 0. Q.E.D.
For simplicity we will assume thatIEF increases withα. A sufficient condition
for this is that the density functiong(ν) is smaller than(P2− EF)/f (I, α).
LEMMA A(4)
ForX ∈ (XRF (α),XEF (α)), the optimal investment level isX − P1.
Proof. In this range Problems (5) and (7) have a corner solution whereRF =
EF = 0. From the definitions ofRF andEF , the investment level isX − P1.
Q.E.D.
Let Xc(α) ≡ P1 + IFB(α). It follows from Lemmas A(1) to A(4) that, when
the firm continues, it will under invest ifX < Xc(α), over invest ifX ∈ (Xc(α),
XFB(α)) and will invest optimally ifX > XFB(α).
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We now analyze the continuation decision. LetαU be the critical value ofα such
that an all-equity firm continues iffα > αU . Assumption 2 implies thatαU > 0. A
comparison ofVc(α, X) given by Problem (2) and the liquidation valueX, yields
thatαU is independent ofX.
LetαL(X) be the critical value ofα such that a leveraged firm continues iffα >
αL(X). WhenαL(X) > αU andα ∈ (αU , αL(X)), the firm liquidates inefficiently.
WhenαL(X) < αU andα ∈ (αL(X), αU), the firm continues inefficiently. The
following lemma comparesαU andαL(X).
LEMMA A(5)
There exists a critical value ofX, Xc ∈ (P1, P1 + P2) such thatαL(Xc) = αU ,
αL(X) > αU if X < Xc, andαL(X) < αU if X > Xc.
Proof. It can be seen from Problems (5) and (7) thatVc(µ) continues and in-
creases in bothα andX. Consider firstX 6 P1 + P2. In this case,VL = 0
and the manager always continues ifVc(µ) > 0. Suppose now thatX = P1. A
comparison of Problems (2) and (5) reveals that for anyα the continuation value of
an all-equity firm is larger than the continuation value for a manager of a leveraged
firm. Thus,αL(P1) > αU . Suppose now thatX = P1 + P2. If the firm usedX to
pay debtholdersP1 + P2, its continuation incentives would be identical to those
of an all-equity firm. Since the firm can useP2 for investment, it has a stronger
incentive to continue, resulting inαU > αL(P1 + P2). By continuity ofVc(µ) in
X,Xc as defined above exists. SinceVc(µ) increases withα andX, it follows that
αL(X) > αU if Xc > X, andαU > αL(X) if X > Xc.
Consider nowX > P1+P2. In this case, the liquidation valueVL = X−P1−P2
increases faster withX thanVc(µ) does. Consequently,αL(X) increases withX.
At X = XFB , αL(X) = αU . Thus,αU > αL(X) for all X > Xc, including
X > P1+ P2.
Note that for allα andX such thatα ∈ (αU , αL(X)), the manager under invests
becauseI ∗ = 0 andIFB > 0. Similarly, for allα andX such thatα ∈ (αL(X),
αU), the manager overinvests becauseI ∗ > 0 while IFB = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.Follows from Lemmas A(1)–A(5). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.The bargaining outcome will eliminate the perverse invest-
ment incentives and will induce the manager to implement the first best investment
policy. Therefore, the negotiation is over the value of the firm under the first best
investment net of disclosure and Chapter 11 costs,VFB −K, whereK = Kd +Kc.
For now we assume thatVFB − K > 0. We show later that this is a necessary
condition for firms to enter Chapter 11.
To understand the outcome of the game, consider the response of a party which
has to accept or reject a reorganization plan,Pn. If the plan is accepted, the firm
pays debtholdersPn in exchange for the entire debt. Following the exchange, the
firm has no debt outstanding and, therefore, the manager implements the first
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best investment policy. The resulting payoff to the manager isVFB − K − Pn.
This outcome also prevails when the plan is rejected by the respondent but the
judge crams it down. If the plan is rejected and the judge does not cram it down,
the game moves with delay to the next stage. The proposer submits a plan that
gives the respondent exactly his value from rejection. This determines the equilib-
rium outcome of the negotiation game. The owner manager can guarantee at least
(1− δ)(VFB−K) because of the first mover advantage. It remains to show that the
judge can implement any payoff in the rangeS = [(1− δ)(VFB−K), (VFB −K)].
Let V be a payoff inS. Let Pn(V ) be a plan that implementsV in the first stage,
i.e.,Pn(V ) satisfiesV = VFB − K − Pn(V ). The judge can implementV in the
first period using the following strategy:
1. Cram down any plan withPn > Pn(V ) at stage 1, and do not cram down
otherwise.
2. If the manager offersPn < Pn(V ) and debtholders reject, give debtholders the
right to propose at every future stage.
Given this strategy, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the manager
to offerPn = Pn(V ), for debtholders to reject, and for the judge to cram the offer
down. (A payoff equivalent subgame perfect equilibrium is for the manager to offer
Pn = Pn(V ) and for the debtholders to accept.) To see this, note that debtholders
get, if the game reaches stage 2, the whole cake, which has a discounted value
of δ(VFB − K) today. Thus, they reject any offer that results in a payoff inS.
Therefore, the manager proposes at stage 1 the lowest value for debtholders that
the judge crams down, namelyPn(V ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.By backwards induction, consider nodeE2 in Figure 2 where the
manager responds to a debtholders’ offer. Chapter 11 yieldsV (P ∗) to the manager
andP ∗ to the debtholders. If the manager rejects the offer and does not commence
Chapter 11, he receivesV ∗ −Kd . Therefore, he accepts any offer that yields him at
least Max{V ∗ − Kd , V (P ∗)}. Therefore, debtholders’ best offer is the highestPd
which is still acceptable to the manager:
VFB −Kd − Pd = Max{V ∗ −Kd, V (P ∗)}. (A4)
Solving forPd we get,
Pd =
{
VFB −Kd − V (P ∗) if V (P ∗) > V ∗ −Kd
VFB − V ∗ if V (P ∗) < V ∗ −Kd. (A5)
Debtholders’ offer,Pd , is their best counter offer (nodeD in Figure 2). At
this juncture, debtholders accept the manager’s offer ifPs > δPd and reject it
otherwise. Consequently, if the manager enters private negotiations, he offers
Ps = δPd. (A6)
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The manager’s payoff in a workout is the total pie minus the amount paid to the
debtholders. Combining Equations (A4), (A5), and (A6), yields the payoffsW of
lemma (1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.Follows from the discussion preceding the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.SupposeP ∗ > P1+P2. Then, the manager can pay the debt
outside Chapter 11, implement the first best investment policy, and save Chapter
11 costs. Thus, the manager never commences Chapter 11. Therefore, when firms
commence Chapter 11,P ∗ < P1 + P2 and the owner manager obtains a positive
payoff, i.e., absolute priority rule is violated. In a workout, since the value of risky
debt is lower thanP1 + P2, and since debtholders’ payoff is below their payoff
under the original debt contract if the new project is undertaken, absolute priority
rule is violated. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.Follows from the discussions in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.Fix P1+ P2 and changeP1 andP2.
Given that the firm continues operations, an increase inP1 shifts the lower three
lines in Figure 3 upward towards the upper line,XFB(α), which is fixed because
P1 + P2 is fixed. This results in more cases of under-investment and less cases of
over-investment. It remains to show the results for the continuation decision. We
do it by showing thatVc(µ) increases withP2, resulting in more continuations as
P2 increases.
Consider the case in whichEF > 0. From Problem (5) and Equation (8) it
follows that only the sumP1 + P2 affects the continuation decision. Therefore, in
this case the continuation decision is not affected by the maturity of the firm’s debt.











Thus, the firm will continue for a larger set ofα. This results in more over-
investment and less under-investment.












(fI (X − P1, α)ν − 1) dG(ν). (A9)
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Using Equation (A3), Equation (A9) can be rewritten as
∂Vc(µ)
∂P2
= H(X − P1, α)+G
(
P2
f (X − P1, α)
)
. (A10)
The second order condition for Problem (7) implies thatHI < 0. WhenRF > 0,
IRF > X − P1. Using these facts we obtain that
∂Vc(µ)
∂P2
> H(IRF , α)+G
(
P2
f (X − P1, α)
)
. (A11)
Now, the first order condition for Problem (7) implies thatH(IRF , α) = 0.
Therefore, and becauseG(·) > 0, we have that∂Vc(µ)/∂P2 > 0.
Thus, the firm will continue for a larger set ofα. This results in more over-
investment and less under-investment. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.
(a) Follows from the discussions in the text.
(b) The firm emerges ifα > αU and liquidates otherwise. In Chapter 11 the man-
ager gets the value from continuation,Vc(µ). SinceVc(µ) increases inα, the
value of equity is higher when the firm emerges than when it liquidates. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8.We show that for a givenX, firms that initiate a workout
have higherα than firms that commence Chapter 11.
Note that forX < Xc, whereXc is defined in Lemma A(5), there is no over-
investment and therefore no Chapter 11. ForX in this range, there are no price
effects. Therefore, we show the result forX > Xc. Letαc(C) be the inverse image
of Xc(α): it is theα that solvesX = P1 + IFB(α). It follows that forα < αc(X)
there is over-investment (given continuation) and forα > αc(X) there is under-
investment (given continuation). The manager over invests ifα < Max{αU ,
αc(X)}, and under invests ifα > Max{αU , αc(X)}. Since total firm value,VFB(α,
X), increases withα, it is higher under a workout than under Chapter 11. Similarly,
becauseV (P ∗) = Vc(µ), the value to the manager,Vc(µ), increases withα. Q.E.D.
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